Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?

Abstract

INTRODUCTION Rational deterrence theory provides scholars with an explanatory framework which specifies the requirements for the success and failure of (1) Yet, conclusive empirical evidence that deterrence successes occur has eluded deterrence theorists. (2) According to Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, the main critics in the most recent challenge to deterrence theory, (3) the empirical evidence suggests that deterrence rarely succeeds. (4) They argue that a review of international incidents over the last ninety years reveals only three cases of extended immediate deterrence success. Based on this review, as well as on their own empirical investigations, Lebow and Stein conclude that deterrence rarely succeeds and that leaders, because of political vulnerabilities, challenge deterrence even when the defender's threats are credible. Lebow and Stein argue that among the most important findings with respect to the dependent variable is the seemingly elusive and fragile nature of the success of immediate deterrence. (5) If Lebow and Stein's interpretation of events is correct, then the thesis, a variation on the scapegoat hypothesis or the diversionary theory of (6) poses a serious challenge to deterrence theory. If a challenger is compelled by domestic or international weakness to challenge deterrence despite the credibility of the defender's threat, or to stand firm and not back down during a crisis for fear of losing face, then deterrence policies are indeed irrelevant and even counter-productive; instead of preventing war they lead to war. Under such circumstances deterrence theory would fail to account for deterrence outcomes and would be a poor conflict management tool. This conclusion, if supported by a closer analysis of the evidence, would pose a serious dilemma for decision-makers in status-quo states. It suggests that the international system contains a group of non-deterrable states and that a defender's use of deterrence is unlikely to succeed. The implications of this conclusion for U.S. policy makers in the post Cold War era would be serious because the United States is most likely to be confronted, in the immediate future, by so called non-deterrable conventional regional powers. Lebow and Stein's conclusion is based to a large extent on their investigation of cases of deterrence failure in the Middle East--the 1969 War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel. This paper examines Lebow and Stcin's conclusion that deterrence successes rarely occur and that leaders challenge deterrence, despite the defender's credible threats, because of political vulnerabilities. It argues that a flawed research design is the reason for Lebow's and Stein's inability to find support for the postulates of deterrence theory. The phenomenon of deterrence, which is temporal, dynamic, and causal, has to be tested by a longitudinal research design and not by research designs that focus on snapshots of single deterrence episodes. Stein's analysis of the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War ignores the important period between the June 1967 Six Day War and the War of Attrition as well as the larger, enduring Egyptian-Israeli rivalry which goes back to the 1948 War. By investigating the role that deterrence played in the enduring conflict between Egypt and Israel from 1948 to 1977, and by focusing on the role that reputation and learning play in overcoming the credibility problem, one can demonstrate that, contrary to Lebow and Stein's claim, deterrence stability can be created even in the more difficult cases in which both challenger and defender seriously intended to attack and defend. (7) Leaders challenge deterrence, or go to war, when there are uncertainties about the capability or will of the defender; and, once these uncertainties are reduced through the creation of specific reputations for capability and will, deterrence stability is created even when political pressures to challenge deterrence continue to exist. …