The Subject of Madness in L. Binswanger's Existential Psychoanalysis

Abstract

The subject of the study is the madness in psychoanalysis. The author considers the problem of naturalistic and phenomenological understanding of the subject of madness in psychoanalysis of Z. Freud and in the existential psychoanalysis of L. Binswanger. The methodological basis is the psychoanalysis of Z. Freud, M. Heidegger's ontology and E. Husserl's phenomenology. L. Binswanger's critique of classical psychoanalysis is presented. The key differences of the definition of the subject in L. Binswanger's existential psychoanalysis are formulated. Naturalism is criticized for the lack of integrity in the consideration of man. Existential analysis is based on the idea that human existence is primary. To reduce a person's life to his drives and instincts means to deprive him of Humanity. L. Binswanger goes further than Z. Freud in his anthropology, arguing that man is more than a being thrown into the cycle of life and death, he can face his fate, the fate of humanity, he not only obeys the forces of life, but can also influence them by changing his fate. Mental health and illness are a reflection of this duality of being – acceptance of the given and individual choice. Madness is a rejection of transcendence, self–isolation in a self–created world-project, when both external and internal are only acting out its scenario, and the freedom of being is avoided, because it appears as a harbinger of non-existence.