Abstract

During military operations between 2001 and 2014, British political and military leaders came to believe that the public were casualty-averse and viewed soldiers sympathetically as victims. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that this interpretation of public opinion altered the way that British combat operations were conducted in Afghanistan. This study finds that this elite interpretation was inaccurate. Providing a first analysis of British media representations of soldiers at key moments throughout the whole campaign, it finds that this interpretation misjudged the nature of soldier victimhood. Where political and military elites attributed public disquiet to military casualties, this research finds that the public was more likely to be concerned with contextual factors (notably competent management) and argues that casualty-aversion was a symptom of this concern rather than its cause—a finding which sees the U.K. experience as supporting and extending U.S.-based theory.

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