War and the Art of Governance

Abstract

Power is one thing. The problem of how to administer it is another. (1) --Douglas MacArthur On 9 April 2003, jubilant crowds and US troops toppled statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad and drew down curtain on major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Within hours of liberation of Baghdad, amid spreading disorder and growing expectations, debate began over reconstruction challenges ahead. Criticism and frustration with chaos on ground intensified over apparent failure of United States to plan adequately for restoration of political and economic order once major combat operations had ended. The root of Washington's failure to anticipate political disorder in Iraq rests precisely in characterization of these challenges as problems, a characterization used by virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The Iraq situation is only most recent example of reluctance of civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to consider establishment of political and economic order as a part of war itself. The point is not academic. It is central to any effective reconstruction strategy in future wars and has profound implications for military's planning, command arrangements, and implementation of current and future governance operations. (2) Military and political leaders need to distinguish between governance operations, which are a core element of all wars, and activities such as peace operations and peacekeeping that may occur independently of war. Labeling political and economic reconstruction as a postwar problem muddles fact that central to strategic victory in all wars fought by United States has been creation of a favorable political order, a process overseen and administered by US military forces--usually Army. The United States entered virtually all of its wars with assumption that government of opposing regime would change or that political situation would shift to favor US interests. During Spanish-American War, we sought to change governments of Cuba and Puerto Rico, and succeeded. During Civil War, Washington was determined to change way South was governed. In Panama in 1989, United States ousted Manuel Noriega, and war did not end until regime against which US forces had fought was out of power and political stability had resumed. In virtually all contingencies, political leaders in Washington conceded that only US military forces were up to task of overseeing and implementing this final aspect of war. Arguably, 2003 war in Iraq is rooted in most prominent recent case where political order did not change--the 1991 Gulf War. Some top Defense Department leaders have called 2003 war a logical conclusion to 1991 campaign. President Bush's early concerns, which emerged during his presidential campaign, about involvement of US military forces in nation-building and peace operations stemmed from his desire to avoid overextending American resources and commitments. (3) A clear distinction between governance operations that are integral to war and myriad of missions referred to in peace operations discourse would be hugely beneficial. Such a distinction would allow US defense planners to focus on political and economic reconstruction that is a part of war, while relegating humanitarian and nation-building missions to other organizations. Moreover, equating governance tasks that occur in all wars with broader missions associated with peace operations and humanitarian assistance reinforces tendency to avoid planning for governance operations in tandem with planning for combat operations. The essential point is this: Combat operations and governance operations are both integral to war and occur in tandem. US soldiers in Iraq today are wondering why, if the war is supposed to be over, we are still being shot at. …