The Socio-Structural Basis of the Long-Term Decline in Traditional Left-Right Class Voting in Affluent Democracies, 1964‐2019

This article attempts to assess the contribution of long-term changes in Swedish social structure to three recent developments in Swedish electoral behavior: the decline of the Social Democrats, the decline in class voting, and the increase in the volatility of party preference. The author argues that the decline of the Social Democrats cannot be attributed to long-term structural changes in the electorate but rather is a product of the policies and electoral strategies pursued by the parties. The decline in class voting is found to be partly attributable to long-term structural change. Original secondary analysis of survey data is then presented to show that the socioeconomic composition of individuals' places of residence affects their voting behavior independent of individual-level characteristics. The author then argues that the parties' policies and electoral strategies have reinforced the tendency toward decreasing class voting. Finally, both long-term structural changes and the decline in class voting itself appear to have caused the increase in the volatility of party choice.

By means of a reanalysis of the most relevant data source—the International Social Mobility and Politics File—this article criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase in crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences rather than a decline in class voting, proves responsible for the decline of traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead—it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline in class voting because of the widespread application of the so-called Alford index.

By means of a re-analysis of the most relevant data source – the International Social Mobility and Politics File – this paper criticizes the newly grown consensus in political sociology that class voting has declined since World War II. An increase in crosscutting cultural voting, rooted in educational differences, rather than a decline in class voting proves responsible for the decline of traditional class-party alignments. Moreover, income differences have not become less, but more consequential for voting behavior during this period. It is concluded that the new consensus has been built on quicksand. Class is not dead – it has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline in class voting, due to the widespread application of the so-called Alford index.

ABSTRACTThe article criticizes stratification measures of social class and class voting, demonstrating that they may produce biased images of the relationship between social class and party choice. Firstly, it is argued that the conventional ‘Alford index of class voting’ is typically not comparable, neither over time nor across countries. Applying a materialist concept of social class, the author then concludes that class voting in Denmark has in fact increased, although Denmark is generally listed as the ‘prototypical’ evidence of the opposite. This difference in perception is due to significant changes in class behaviour which are concealed by stratification measures of social class.

Aspecter is haunting the long-standing class theory of politics - the specter of the rightist working class. Social conflicts and voting patterns in Western nations indicate a gradual erosion of working-class support for the left, a process that class theory itself cannot adequately explain. Farewell to the Leftist Working Class aims to fill this gap by developing, testing, and confirming an alternative explanation of rightist tendencies among the underprivileged. The authors challenge the widely held assumption that weakening working-class support for leftist parties indicates first of all a decline in class voting and a breakdown of class politics. Instead, they argue, cultural issues that revolve around individual liberty and maintenance of social order have become much more significant since World War II. The obligation to work and strict notions of deservingness have become central to the debate about the welfare state. Under these circumstances authoritarianism undermines solidarity with the unemployed, so that the latter is no longer guaranteed by working-class economic egalitarianism. Indeed, although economic egalitarianism is more typically found among the working class, it is only firmly connected to a universalistic and inclusionary progressive political ideology among the middle class. Farewell to the Leftist Working Class reports cutting-edge research into the withering away of working-class support for the left and the welfare state, drawing mostly on survey data collected in Western Europe, the United States, and other Western countries. Although it is based on large-scale quantitative analyses of survey data, great pains have been taken to safeguard accessibility and to present the material in as reader-friendly a way as possible.

In the light of observations of the decline in class voting, some scholars have suggested that the class variable should be reconstructed in a way that makes post-industrial labor market trends more visible. A leading proponent of this view is Daniel Oesch. In this article we compare the development in class voting according to his class schema compared to a more traditional one, in the Swedish National Election Studies 1968-2014. The results show that the schemas give remarkably similar results, that Oesch’s schema is not markedly better at predicting voting for newer political parties, and that the development in the distribution of positions in the labor market does not make a big difference for the strength of class voting. We discuss the implications of these findings.

This study is a comparative survey analysis of similarities and differences in the Scandinavian party systems. These are all dominated by three big class parties, Social Democrat, Agrarian, Conservative, each representing mainly one occupational group. The study investigates the electoral basis of each type of class party in order to explain class voting, and it finds a similar pattern of social factors which influence class voting. The article also considers the differences between the Scandinavian party systems, the psychological variables influencing class voting, a possible decline in class voting, and the distinctiveness of the Scandinavian party systems compared to other types of party systems.

This paper extends previous work on the changing importance of individual and contextual social class in Britain. We adopt a multi‐level framework for analysis, linking surveys fromthe 1964–1997 British Election Studies with Census data on the social‐class composition of constituencies. The goal of the paper is to test whether, net of individual social‐class effects, the social‐class composition of the constituency in which the voter lives has declined in importance over time. We found that contextual class effects were consistently significant and fairly constant throughout the period under study. We also find a gradual increase in the amount of constituency variation in vote. Although the proportion of this variation explained by contextual and individual social class has remained fairly constant for Conservative vote, it has decreased for Labour vote. Ultimately, we find evidence of a decline in class voting, but no evidence of a growth in the individualism of voters.

Class voting, social changes and political changes in the Netherlands 1971–2006

Abstract: With information collected from samples of health care professionals (practicing physicians and pharmacists), and against a back cloth of differing theoretical prognostications, this paper examines the nature and determinants of middle class political ideology in Ontario, Canada. We find significant variations in ideological belief within the professional middle-class. Structural, work related factors were the most important source of attitudes about the distribution of wealth, whereas gender, and other background variables, explained more of the variation in beliefs about welfare and equity policies. The findings are then discussed in terms of: theories of the new middle class; gender and politics; and the composition of political ideology. Resume: Grace aux renseignements provenant d'un echantillon de professionnels de la sante (medecins praticiens et pharmaciens), et sur une toile de fond de pronostications theoriques divergentes, l'auteure de cet article examine la nature et les facteurs determinants de l'ideologie politique de la classe moyenneen Ontario, au Canada. Elle constate qu'il existe des ecarts importants dans les opinions ideologiques au sein professionnels de la classe moyenne. Les facteurs lies au travail et d'ordre structural representaient la plus grande source d'attitudes au sujet de la repartition des richesses tandis que les sexes et les autres variables d'origine expliquaient davantage les ecarts d'opinions sur le bien-etre et les politiques d'equite. Les resultats sont discutes en termes de theories de la nouvelle classe moyenne, de sexe et politique et de composition de l'ideologie politique. Introduction: Thinking about the Middle Class Currently there is no shortage of scholars willing to proclaim that class, both as a concept and as an influence on political events, is dead or, at the very least, in need of major resuscitation (Clark and Lipset, 1991; Clark, Lipset and Rempel, 1993; Pahl, 1993; Grusky and Sorensen, 1998). The general tenor of the argument is that under conditions of 'post modernism' or 'post industrialism,' peoples' interests and identities are no longer anchored in occupational or economic activity. This is evidenced by a decline in class voting and electoral behaviour that corresponds less and less readily to the traditional polarity of the 'left-right' ideological dimension. 'Class,' it is suggested, has been swept away with the rise of 'post-material values' (Inglehart, 1977; 1990). However, amidst these claims, there is, ironically, evidence of a counter trend: growing interest in the nature of one group hitherto neglected in studies of class formation -- the middle class. Indeed, among students of social stratification not necessarily persuaded that class has become an irrelevance, the middle class is now receiving more attention than it ever did in the past. There is little doubt that this development is attributable to its growing size and diversity (Savage et. al., 1992; Butler and Savage, 1995; Langford, 1996). In contrast to a contracting manual working class, the focus of most post war debates about the changing class structure, there has been a huge expansion of professional and managerial positions -- core jobs in any body's classification of the middle class -- over the past two or three decades (Cuneo, 1983; Myles, 1988; Statistics Canada, 1988; Clement and Myles, 1994). However, recognition that the professions and management are key elements in its conceptualization does not imply agreement about the nature of the contemporary middle class. Indeed, recent exercises in re-mapping the middle class highlight distinctions, as well as commonalities, between its two principle occupational components (Goldthorpel982; Torstendahl, and Burrage, 1990). Moreover, debate about the modern middle class is not restricted to its structural determinants: there is a parallel dialogue about its political role and ideological tendencies. …

This is a study of changes that have occurred in British party and electoral politics since 1964. It assesses the decline of Labour party support and attributes it to changes in social structure that have reduced the size of class groups which provided the bulk of the Labour vote and to the reduced appeal of Labour to these groups. A similar decline in Conservative support among traditional Tory social groups makes this a general phenomenon of declining class voting. The consequence of this decline has been to open the way to individual choice between parties based on issue preferences rather than class loyalty. It also results in the rising support for minor parties in response to new issue concerns. To account for these changes, the author employs evidence from surveys conducted after each of the seven general elections held between 1964 and 1983. The presentation has been so structured as to make it easy to follow the main line of argument.

This paper investigates the questions how the political culture in twenty western countries has changed in the postwar period and how these changes in political culture are related to the decline in class voting in (most of) these countries, which has been reported by Nieuwbeerta (1995). It appears that old issues, which are related to class-conflict, have declined slightly in the postwar period, while new issues such as ecological and cultural issues have risen in salience remarkably in the same period. Our analysis shows that the most important determinant of the degree of contextual class voting is cultural issue salience. In the end of this paper I discuss the implications of my findings for the 'death of class' debate.

In many countries with multiparty systems, a decline in class voting has increased volatility and the need for comprehensive information about the political landscape among voters. Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are online tools that match users to political parties and, as such, they hold a promise of reinforcing informational transparency and democratic representation. The current research investigated whether VAAs live up to this expectation by investigating to what extent VAAs affected users' political knowledge and vote choice in the Dutch national elections of 2012. Results show that VAA users feel that the VAA improved their political knowledge. In addition, those groups of VAA users who experienced a large knowledge increase, also relatively often indicated that their vote choice had been affected. This suggests that VAAs contribute to informational transparency by increasing knowledge among a potentially wide audience, and also that VAAs might increase democratic representation to the extent that VAAs persuade people to vote for the candidate that best represents their opinions. On the other hand, we found discrepancies between behavioural and perceptual measurements of the effect of VAAs on vote choice. This raises doubts about whether VAAs shape actual voting behaviours and knowledge, or rather perceptions of that.

Social classes and political behaviours: Directions for a geographical analysis

Social class has long been recognized as being the preeminent influence upon electoral choice in Britain, but recent studies provide support for the argument that it has become a weakened force. These studies differ only in the interpretation that they place on its decline. Through the simultaneous estimation of the effects on voting choice of class measured by occupation, and other variables, this article shows how one of the recent studies implied an overestimate of the declining importance of occupational class. Further it shows that when the indirect effects of class on party choice are taken into account, by means of causal modeling techniques, its preeminent position in determining voting choice in Britain can still be seen. The article seeks to clarify the nature of class-based voting behavior during a period of dramatic decline in this phenomenon, terminating at the last point at which traditional measures can reasonably be used.