Abstract
The evolution of the EU supervisory architecture has demonstrated that it took the risk of a euro break-up to barely overcome the Member States and their supervisors’ political resistances to centralisation. In the two-tier Europe that is emerging after the euro crisis, the integrity of the single market seems today crucially interlinked with the success of the banking union and its attractiveness for non-euro countries. The banking union’s design, without a credible common fiscal backstop, remains however a partial solution to the financial stability issues arising from the fragmentation of the EU financial market in the event of banking crises. Against this background, this work performs an analysis on non-euro countries’ own assessments of the pros and cons of joining the banking union. The analysis aims at showing that until fiscal responsibility for financial stability remains at the national level, regulatory centralisation cannot sever the traditional divide between home and host supervisors. JEL: F35; F65; G01; G28
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.