The "Practice" Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine

Abstract

Abstract: Military doctrine on stability operations reflects a planning-school approach, which assumes rebuilding the capacity of weak or failed states is a matter of preparation and technique. This article argues the problems of stabilization are not just those of process; they reflect deep-rooted philosophical differences surrounding the viability of these operations and the approaches used. When it comes to state-building, military doctrine lacks a basis in an uncontested theory of victory. ********** Stabilization is out of fashion. Burned by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western states have little appetite for engagement in complex nation-building tasks. But, if the international community is serious in its commitment to provide political solutions to such crises as in it will be difficult to avoid confronting the problems of stabilization experienced in the recent past. For example, the motion passed by the British parliament giving agreement to air attacks in Syria also identified explicitly military action as only one component of a broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria, and this commitment underlines the importance of planning for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. (1) Western militaries have responded to the challenges of the last decade and a half with a process of doctrinal revision. For example, the United States produced a specific doctrine for stability operations in 2008, revising it in 2014; the latest iteration of the United Kingdom's doctrine for stability operations was published in March 2016. (2) In theory, this process of learning lessons should ensure future operations go much more smoothly than those of the past. This article contends this is likely not to be the case. Colonel Charles Callwell noted in his 1906 treatise on small wars, Theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way. (3) The difficulty for military doctrine is there is no consensus on the practice of complex nation-building. This is evident in the many debates outlined in the literature on peacebuilding, such as the one featured in the previous issue of this journal. Military doctrine on stability operations reflects predominantly a planning-school approach. (4) Consciously or unconsciously, this approach assumes rebuilding the capacity of weak or failed states is a matter of preparation and technique. It is about planning, inter-agency cooperation, and a whole-of-government approach. It assumes success is a matter of the right principles and the right techniques. It reflects a rationalist, problem-solving approach. Military doctrine on stabilization reflects Western liberal assumptions on how these operations should be conducted. However, as the wider literature on peacebuilding illustrates, there is a sustained argument surrounding the validity and viability of Western liberal approaches to international intervention. (5) For some commentators, stabilization operations require fundamentally different approaches if they are to be successful. For others, the notion external interventions can create functioning democratic states is not viable. In consequence, the whole enterprise rests on uncertain foundations. Put another way, the challenges of stability operations and stabilization are not the result of the wrong strategy or the wrong techniques, tactically or operationally. Instead, the difficulties derive from fundamental uncertainties about whether such operations can be done at all. This article is divided into three parts. The first part looks at the planning-school approach that underpins military doctrine on stability operations, highlighting some of the key strands associated with this perspective. Next, the article examines the views of those who reject fundamentally the viability of liberal approaches to intervention. Finally, the article addresses the views of those who believe complex nation-building interventions can be executed effectively, but with radically different philosophical approaches required. …