Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (review)

Abstract

Volume 9. No.2 l-Vinter 1991 79 overall scheme of the Government offices in the sixties to evacuate the old neighborhoods of Jerusalem that were in a deplorably physical and social state and to transfer their populations to new neighborhoods. These rundown neighborhoods were then to be renovated-a plan"that was only partially successful. Yemin Moshe is an example of achievement only from the standpoint of the governmental institutions which initiated this program. The author generally carried out his work faithfully in the second half of the book in his analysis of the process of the evacuation, background, the institutions that initiated the program and their various motivations, and the fate of those tho were displaced. This is all placed amidst harsh criticism for the entire process itself. We must nevertheless note that the "Yemin Moshe model" of displacement and repopulation was never repeated. As a substitute, the Israeli government , in the early days of Menachem Begin's leadership, inaugurated a project for the restoration of neighborhoods, an arrangement diametrically opposite to the "Yemin Moshe model," which worked towards the physical and social renovation of problematic neighborhoods while leaving their original residents in place. The Yemin Moshe neighborhood is a fascinating area. Its history still awaits a more complete analysis, as this book does not provide the complete story that its title promises. Yossi Katz Department of Geography Bar IIan University Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine, by Ariel Levite. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies No. 12. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. 192 pp. $18.00. Lacking defensible borders, facing a highly unfavorable balance of forces, and without solid allies, all of Israel's political leaders from Ben Gurion to Shamir have looked to the Israel Defense Forces, the IDF, as the main, in fact the only, reliable guarantor of the country's existence. This role makes the IDF's military doctrine of special interest and subject to an ongoing debate in Israeli political, military, and academic circles. The author perceives a duality between Israel's strategic doctrine, the major policies used to secure the national objectives, and military operational doctrine, concerned with the composition and fighting methods of the IDF. The first, he notes, has a basic defensive orientation concerned with maintaining the status quo, that is, preserving the state within acceptable and se- 80 SHOFAR cure boundaries. By contrast he sees the second as primarily offensive with an emphasis on carrying hostilities as soon as possible into enemy territory and, if necessary, striking to preempt an attack. Ariel Levite, who completed this study while a Senior Research Associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, is neither a hawk nor a dove. He does, however, assert that radically changed circumstances , geostrategic, political, military, technological, economic, and social, require a serious reevaluation of basic doctrine, virtually unchanged since it first was formulated shortly after the War of Independence. The study begins with a short theoretical discussion of military doctrine in general and then turns to the specific case of Israel. The author shows how and why the IDF adopted an offensive doctrine, adapted it to changing technologies , and used it in combat. It was, he recognizes, effective, but he feels that changed conditions require modification of the excessive stress on offensive fighting in favor of an operational doctrine combining offensive and defensive elements. Such a major shift, demanding changes in training and indoctrination of the officer corps, Levite believes, would require strong support by the military as well as civilian leadership. The study gives a solid account of the evolution and application of IDF doctrine, but moves on to shak.')' ground when, attempting to bolster his case, the author includes historical analogies with states in positions perceived to be similar to Israel. This is especially true when he compares the IDF's stress on the offensive with so-called "cult of the offensive" which dominated military thinking of the great powers of Europe in 1914. Surely, Germany, Austria -Hungary, France, or Russia had the strategic depth and the manpower reserves to choose a defensive option, but whether Israel has the strategic depth and the resources to afford such a course remains, to...