THE POLITICS OF LEGISLATIVE CURTAILMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: OBSTACLES TO POLICE‐PATROL OVERSIGHT

Abstract

State Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs), like their federal counterpart, attempt to even the odds that citizens’rights will be protected as administrative agencies exercise quasi‐legislative and quasi‐judicial functions. North Carolina is one of several states which has recently attempted to constrain agency power in rulemaking and complaint adjudication. This is a case study of policy outcomes attained by the North Carolina General Assembly in its 1985 revision of the state's APA. Why did some state legislators’efforts to assume stricter oversight over administrative rulemaking fall far short of the kind of control and accountability they aimed for? We explore three types of obstacles to APA reform encountered in North Carolina. Each is relevant to other states. First, direct surveillance or “police‐patrol” techniques of legislative oversight impose undesirable political costs on legislators. Second, there is an absence of (or categorical precedence is against) the adoption of such techniques. Third, executive‐legislative branch conflict and complex separation of powers issues arise when state legislatures attempt to curtail administrative rulemaking in significantly new and restrictive ways.