The Politics of Decentralization

Abstract

Decentralization reforms are taking place in most developing nations. Whether or not these reforms involve forest resources, they are transforming the local institutional infrastructure on which local forest management is based. These reforms are believed to produce institutional conditions for more equitable and efficient resource management. Many decentralization reforms, however, are taking place in a manner that does not establish the necessary conditions to produce the positive outcomes that theory predicts. This article argues that the central condition for effective decentralization is representation. Democratic representation consists of downwardly accountable and responsive local authorities. Accountability requires that the local population can sanction the local authorities via various accountability mechanisms. Responsiveness requires powers that enable these local authorities to respond to local demands. Due to resistance by governments and poor choices by NGOs and donors, non-democratic local institutions— i.e. institutions that are not accountable to the local populations—are often being chosen for “decentralized” forest management. In addition, they are often given inappropriate and insufficient powers. The paper explores which institutions are being empowered and with what powers. The paper ends with some questions concerning the choice of institutions and powers that practitioners, activists, policy makers, donors or researchers can ask to help evaluate whether decentralization efforts are being legislated and implemented in a manner that theory indicates will result in positive outcomes.