Choosing Representation: Institutions and Powers for Decentralized Natural Resources Management

Abstract

Decentralization reforms are taking place in most developing nations, transforming the local institutional infrastructure upon which local forest management is based. Although intended to produce institutional conditions for more equitable and efficient resources management, most decentralization reforms fail to establish the basic conditions that theory predicts would lead to positive outcomes. This chapter argues that the central condition for effective decentralization is representation. Democratic representation consists of downwardly accountable and responsive local authorities. Accountability requires that the local population can sanction the local authorities via various accountability mechanisms. Responsiveness requires powers that enable these local authorities to respond to local demands. Because of resistance by governments and poor choices by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donors, local institutions that are not accountable to the local populations are often being chosen for ‘decentralized’ forest management. In addition, they are often given inappropriate and insufficient powers. This chapter asks which local institutions best serve the function of representation in decentralization reforms. It also queries the choice of powers being devolved to local institutions in natural resource decentralizations. These two elements of decentralization cannot be separated: accountability without powers is empty (there is no responsiveness), and power without accountability is dangerous (there is no check on the exercise of power). The chapter concludes with questions that can help policy-makers, donors and researchers evaluate whether decentralization efforts are being legislated and implemented in a manner that theory indicates will result in positive outcomes.