Abstract
Given its official objectives, the Treaty of Nice is a failure. This paper applies political–economic reasoning to explain the failure. The starting point is that eastern enlargement can only be successfully completed if the interests of decisive players in present EU countries are respected. The Treaty of Nice is reinterpreted as an opportunity for EU-15 players to protect their interests in an enlarged community and to overcome a commitment problem on the side of the newcomers. After identifying decisive players and their interests, the results of Nice are analysed. It is shown that reweighting of Council votes and seat allocation in the Parliament favour EU-15 interests and partially contradicts official objectives including capability to act. Nice has improved the outlook for a successful enlargement, because legislators with veto power on enlargement are less likely to veto since their interests are better protected.
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