Introduction: Democratic Institutions for a New Europe

Abstract

Institutional reforms have up to now always preceded or immediately followed any major enlargement round of the European Union, fueling functionalist hopes that the organization will ultimately become a nation-state. Yet the prolonged failure to redistribute power effectively between member states, the Commission, the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice means that these past successes have also stretched the size and the institutions of the Union to the limit. Despite its minimalist results, the Treaty of Nice was not yet in force in the fall of 2002, causing the European Union to face considerable problems in dealing adequately with the Eastern enlargement, allegedly the greatest challenge it has ever faced. By admitting up to 12 new members during the next decade, not only will the European Union increase in size, but, what is more troubling, heterogeneity among the member states will grow to an unprecedented degree. Excessive divergence could become a problem far beyond Groucho Marx’s famous quip: ‘I sent the club a wire stating: “Please accept my resignation.” I don’t want to belong to any club that will accept me as a member.’1 The theory of collective action suggests that the provision of the collective good, be it a pure public good or a club good, becomes more cumbersome the more actors contribute to it and the more dissimilar they are (Sandler, 1992). Although increased trade between the old and new member states might offset some of these negative aspects (Schneider, 2002), this might not be enough to bind the members of an increasingly heterogeneous club together. Only a proper set of institutions can guarantee that the European Union will provide the collective goods that the member states expect it to deliver. The ratification pains felt over the Treaty of Nice are, however, an indication 01 Schneider (to/d) 1/23/03 4:09 PM Page 5