Abstract

Theory: Theories of economic voting are applied to competitive elections in the developing world. Hypotheses: The effect of the macroeconomy on electoral support for incumbent parties is mitigated by the impact of the economy on turnout and the relative sensitivity of voters to recession and growth. Method: Pooled time series data on aggregate electoral data for eight developing countries are analyzed using least squares with dummy variables (LSDV). Results: Economic decline imposes enormous electoral costs on governments, but economic growth provides no electoral benefits.

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