Security and economic voting: support for incumbent parties in Colombian presidential elections

Abstract

Theories of economic voting developed in the United States and Europe take security for granted. However, many countries in other regions of the world suffer from daily political violence. The Colombian experience suggests that additional sources of performance failure beyond traditional economic measures should be examined to understand support for incumbents. Colombia has suffered from political violence for decades. This paper examines whether or not political violence is a factor that should be taken into consideration when explaining support for incumbent parties. Given the peculiarities of its party system, accountability is not easy to assess in Colombia, so factors that may undermine the clarity of accountability are also examined. In addition to political violence, traditional economic voting variables such as unemployment, inflation, and gross domestic product (GDP) growth are included. Colombia has experienced varying intensities of political violence and differing economic conditions since the reforms that culminated in the 1991 constitution. We examine first round presidential elections in 1998, 2002 and 2006 to see if the theory of economic voting should be supplemented with violence to understand support for incumbent parties.