Political preferences in times of crisis: Economic voting in the 2011 Polish elections

Abstract

This article is a case study of a single election in a single country focusing on the economic theory of voting during the 2011 parliamentary election in Poland. These are very specific elections, first because of the context – global economic crisis, and second, because for the first time after collapse of communism the incumbent party retained power by winning a second election in a row. In our analyses, we tested classic economic theory of voting hypotheses. Briefly, the hypotheses are derived from the reward/punishment model, in which it is assumed that satisfied with economic condition voters support governing parties, and dissatisfied voters favour opposition parties. The empirical tests are grounded in two alternative analytical approaches: the discrete choice and the propensity to vote models. In our analyses we use multiple regression models, in which the effects of the perceptions of economy factor on vote choice is controlled by several other independents. Main hypotheses drawn from the theory of economic voting are confirmed in our analyses. Positive assessment of the economy increases the probability of voting for incumbent parties. On the other hand, voters dissatisfied with the economic situation tend to vote for the main opposition party.