Abstract
This chapter begins with an investigation of the reasons for the presumed certainty of the existence of the external, mind-independent world around us, and considers a selection of arguments directed against the existence of such an external world. I begin by arguing that we do not need to postulate an external world in order to justify the illusion–reality distinction, or to explain the coherence, intersubjectivity, and efficacy of our perception. The second main part of the chapter focuses on the discussion of different theories of perception (naïve realism, disjunctivism, representationalism) and the ontologies they involve, arguing that ultimately a kind of brain-based representationalism (referred to as irrealism) works best as a theory of perception but that this, somewhat surprisingly, also undermines the justification of a mind-independent world of material objects.
Published Version
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