Did Locke Hold the Representative Theory of Perception?

Abstract

Locke’s equivocal usage of the term ‘idea’ in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding has led to different interpretations of his theory of perception regarding the external world. First, the traditional and orthodox philosophers have interpreted the term ‘idea’ as a mental entity of a specific kind, i.e. a mental image, locked up inside the mind. This is referred to as the crude form of representationalism. Secondly, Woozley has pointed out that the word ‘idea’ can be interpreted as ‘meaning of words’, permitting the presentation of Locke’s theory of perception regarding the external world in a more sophisticated form in contrast to the crude form of representationalism. However, there are no good reasons to hold that Locke consistently adhered to either of these two views. Locke’s theory of perception regarding external world cannot even be termed as direct realism. The present paper attempts an in-depth study of the views expressed by several philosophers in this context and shows that some kind of representationalism does appear to be present in Locke’s theory of perception regarding the external world.