The Direct Contextual Realism Theory of Perception

Abstract

Direct realist theories of perception do not receive much consideration today, aside from the cursory refutations that have appeared in the lit erature for decades.1 The model of perception most widely accepted today, dominant across not just mainstream philosophy of mind but also psychology, cognitive science, and neurophysiology, is (or representational) realism. For indirect realism, the external world's existence and knowability is not compromised by its absence in expe rience. There are notorious difficulties involved with sustaining indi rect realism's viability in the face of challenges from the idealist (why doesn't experience simply encompass all reality?) and the skeptic (how can we know anything beyond experience?). Direct realists see such difficulties as unnecessary and preventable. If some form of direct real ism can effectively reply to these challenges, philosophy of mind and psychology would be radically transformed. This paper develops one sophisticated type of direct realist theory, the direct contextual realism (DCR) theory of perception. DCR holds that perception is a natural process of experience that contains a por tion of the perceived object (typically its surface) within that process. This theory's origins may be traced back to the attempts by pragma tists, especially John Dewey, to formulate an alternative to dualistic and idealistic accounts of experience. These origins will not be surveyed here,2 although they inspire my efforts to revive direct contextual real ism. For today's readers, the motivation for giving this theory due con sideration will be developed in two stages. First, this paper examines a strong argument by John Foster against direct realism in order to expose a contradiction within its foundations. Second, it shows how this con tradiction can be avoided through contextualizing perception while at