The Next Korean War: Drawing Lessons From Israel's Experience in the Middle East*

Abstract

What would an armed conflict between the two Koreas look like? The following analysis examines this question by drawing lessons from the history of military clashes between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian adversaries. Firstly, it suggests that an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be limited in its scope. Although qualitatively inferior, the North Korean military could conduct a limited ground maneuver south to the DMZ by employing Egypt’s strategy in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. A South Korean counterattack would also be limited. Advancing too deep beyond the DMZ would provoke Pyongyang to go on a nuclear alert and encourage Chinese and American pressure on Seoul to pull back. A South Korean refusal to comply could invite foreign intervention, similar to the American intervention in the 1973 War. Secondly, this paper explores the challenge of guerrilla warfare (both above and below ground) that ROK forces are likely to encounter if they cross the DMZ. Israel’s experiences in the 2006 Lebanon War and in Operations Cast Lead (2008) and Protective Edge (2014) illustrate that in facing such a challenge, even an indisputably superior force may have to pay a heavy price in casualties. Given that North Korean nuclear deterrence would prevent ROK forces from implementing reunification war plans, South Korea should consider stopping its counterattack at the DMZ, rather than pursuing the enemy into a terra incognita of topographical and subterranean traps.