The Nature and Systematic Role of Evidence: Husserl as a Proponent of Mentalist Evidentialism

Abstract

AbstractIn the previous chapter, by showing that Husserl is a moderate foundationalist, I shed light on how justification is structured according to a Husserlian epistemology. However, we still need to discuss the nature of justification. What are our justifiers, how do they justify, and what gives them their justificatory force? In this chapter, we discuss a concept that is central for Husserl’s phenomenology in general and for his epistemology in particular. This is the concept of evidence. I shall show that for Husserl (1) evidence determines epistemic justification and (2) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one’s ultimate evidence consists of one’s originary presentive intuitions. This means that, in modern analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. This chapter shall be concluded by highlighting that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Conee & Feldman. While Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that, for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely their originary givenness. This will bring us directly to the next chapter.