Husserl’s Phenomenological Intuitionism

Abstract

AbstractIn the previous chapter, we discussed the systematic role and epistemic status of a priori intuitions. For Husserl, a priori intuitions are a source of immediate but fallible justification that can reveal structures of reality and immediately justify basic phenomenological-epistemological principles. A priori intuitions are analogous to perceptual experiences in the sense that both of them are originary presentive acts. We have seen above that, for a phenomenological epistemology, determining the character of originary givenness is of the greatest significance. However, what it precisely means to have the character of orginary givenness depends on the respective type of experience. The fact that perceptual experiences and a priori intuitions are both originary presentive intuitions does not imply that they do not differ phenomenologically. In fact, eidetic intuitions have a distinctive phenomenal character that is clearly different from perceptual experiences. Following Husserl, we say that eidetic intuitions have the phenomenal character of apodicticity. It is the objective of this chapter to provide a precise Husserlian characterization of this character of apodicticity. While Chap. 8 can be seen as complementing Chap. 5 in the sense that we have seen that for Husserl not only perceptual experiences but also eidetic intuitions are a fallible source of justification, the present chapter can be seen as complementing Chap. 7, as we shall see that not only perceptual experiences but also eidetic intuitions gain their justificatory force from their distinctive phenomenal character. Furthermore, Chaps. 8, 9, and 12 are intrinsically connected in clarifying the rationalist elements within our Husserlian system. According to Husserl, “a completed intuitionism is by itself a completed rationalism, and conversely” (Hua XXXV, 291). In Chap. 8, we have seen that Husserl’s phenomenological-epistemological system is an intuitionism in the sense that a priori intuitions are treated as an autonomous source of immediate and substantial justification. In the present chapter, we focus on the phenomenological aspect of Husserl’s intuitionism by determining the precise phenomenal character that gives eidetic intuitions their justificatory force. In Chap. 12, this rationalist project will be completed by showing in what sense Husserlian phenomenology is intended to be First Philosophy, the ultimate science.