Intuitional Justification

Abstract

AbstractIn the previous chapter, my objective was to improve current versions of PCEJ by offering a phenomenological analysis of the justification-conferring phenomenal character of perceptual experiences that is epistemologically more defensible and phenomenologically more adequate than rival versions. The objective of the present chapter is to identify systematic similarities between perceptual experiences and rational intuitions and to offer a phenomenological analysis of the justification-conferring phenomenal character of such intuitional experiences. The focus will be on mathematical intuitions. Analogously to the previous chapter, my main objective is not to argue that rational intuitions are a source of immediate justification (by virtue of their distinctive phenomenal character) but to elaborate on their justification-conferring phenomenal character. We shall see that the phenomenal character of intuitional experiences differs in important aspects from the justification-conferring phenomenal character of perceptual experiences, which is often overlooked in current debates. Importantly, rational intuitions (as well as perceptual experiences) are not simply seemings that push us towards believing their contents. Our starting point will be the phenomenon of perceptual learning. Recently, perceptual learning has become a focus of philosophical investigations. This is because it sheds light on the nature of perception. It tells us that the physical objects that are perceived are not the sole causes of perceptual states, it reveals that previous experiences shape the way we perceive, and it brings into focus an experience’s phenomenal character. Hence, there is no doubt that perceptual learning has crucial implications for philosophy of mind. Only very recently, however, have researchers begun to investigate whether we can draw genuinely epistemological lessons from perceptual learning. In the first section, we shall see that such epistemological lessons do indeed exist. In particular, the cases of perceptual learning we will discuss highlight the intimate connection between an experience’s justificatory force and its phenomenal character. The rest of the chapter is devoted to showing that there are analogous cases of intuitional learning. By discussing simple examples, it is argued that such cases of intuitional learning suggest that intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that have a distinctive phenomenal character, and that it is this distinctive phenomenal character that makes intuitions a source of immediate justification. The main objective of this chapter is to elaborate the distinctive justification-conferring phenomenal character of intuitions.