Abstract
Abstract The current U.S. maritime strategy exemplifies a force‐planning mechanism alternative to conventional systems analysis. Flaws inherent in systems analysis become particularly evident when it is applied to maritime forces, which are least tied to specific scenarios or specific modes of operation and which actually gain much of their efficacy from their flexibility, hence from the ambiguity of the threats they present to a prospective adversary. The maritime strategy takes account of interactive, i.e., second‐ and third‐order, considerations. The connection between flexibility and basic naval warfare objectives is explored, and the relationship between these factors and the U.S. naval force structure is shown.
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