The Making of the Guomindang’s Japan Policy, 1932-1937

Abstract

From the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the Nanjing government's agenda was dominated by relations with Japan and conflict with the communists. To deal with the dual threat, Chiang Kai-shek formulated the policy of first internal pacification, then external resistance (xian annei, hou rangwai). Hence, suppressing the communists would take precedence over resisting Japan. The wisdom of this approach was widely contested in the party, the government, and the country at large. It was branded by its critics a policy of nonresistance (bu dikang) toward Japan. But Chiang had the staunch support of Wang Jingwei, the veteran and influential party leader who had formed a political alliance with him in January 1932. They stayed the course despite mounting opposition. Their cooperation in dealing with the Japanese threat gradually dissolved only after Wang withdrew to Europe to recuperate after an assassination attempt in November 1935. In China and in the West, this political alliance forged between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek has conventionally been portrayed as joining two unequal partners. Chiang's contemporaries often recollected that the real power of the Nanjing government was in the hands of Chiang (Jiang Tingfu, 1984: 149; He Lian, 1988: 112-15; Chen Gongbo, 1979: 326-30). This assessment has been readily