The logic of functional explanations

Abstract

Little has been achieved in the way of providing a satisfactory analysis of functional explanations in biology and the social sciences. Hempel has demonstrated the impossibility of straightforward translation of functional statements in terms of regularity, or contrary to fact conditional statements. To cite his own example, it may be known both that the circulation of blood and the emission of noise are causally related to the pumping action of the heart, that neither effect would occur if the heart failed to pump and both effects, perhaps, may be satisfactorily explained by appeal to covering laws. Yet the biologist, though willing to assert that among other things, the heart functions to circulate blood, is disinclined to state that the heart functions to emit noise.l There are other problems that make difficult the identification of functional statements with statements of causally necessary conditions. Natural hearts may be replaced by artificial devices, thereby blocking such claims as the presence of a heart is a necessary condition for blood circulation. The same set of problems a fortiori afflict the analysis of functional discourse in the social sciences. For often, if not always, the existence of social structures have consequences which serve no apparent function. Thus, a consequence of industrialization may be air pollution or urban population concentration may result in a growing crime rate. And even when it is claimed that functions can be identified as when it is claimed that the function of religious ritual is the enhancement of feelings of group cohesiveness, functional equivalents