Functional Analysis and the Species Design

Abstract

Chapter 3 is about functional explanation in biology, rather than directly about mental content, but in this chapter the author defends a controversial premise of the methodological argument for teleosemantics (given in chapter 4). The premise is that physiologists and neurophysiologists ascribe normal-proper functions in explaining how bodies and brains operate for significant scientific reasons. How an organic system operates in the here and now depends on the actual causal contributions its components make in the here and now, and yet biologists also describe the normal-proper functions of components when explaining how (and not just why) complex organic systems operate or function the way they do. Central to the biologists’ task is describing systems that are functioning normally or properly (e.g., normal human visual systems, or normal human immune systems). The author explains how this role of a malfunction-permitting notion of function (sometimes called a “normative” notion) is consistent with the etiological theory of functions, but the aim here is not to establish the truth of the etiological theory of functions (which is defended in other works).