Abstract
In between the time of John Austin and H.L.A. Hart a great legacy, and an accompanying debate, spawned out of the work(s) of Sir Henry Maine. While employing a primarily comparative, historical perspective, Maine sought to scrutinize and redefine the way philosophy relates to the social sciences within jurisprudential enquiries. From this perspective, the present paper aims to reclaim and represent Maine’s work as a project in and for the philosophy of law. A project which came to inspire and influence future generations of philosophers, and two subsequent schools of thought, by instigating a forgotten debate around the concept of custom, its relation to the concept law, and the status of customary law. This examination will close with a note, highlighting certain aspects the revival of Maine’s works, as well as the legacy which spawned out of them, can have generally for the philosophy of law and interdisciplinary jurisprudence, as well as more particularly for the philosophy of customary international law.
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