The Kosovo Model: A (Bad) Precedent for Conflict Management in the Caucasus?

Abstract

Abstract:Resolution 1244 adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1999 was conceived as an interim settlement to allow conflict de-escalation while post-poning the search for a lasting solution to the crisis. The final settlement should have been negotiated between Serbian authorities and representatives of the Albanians and then endorsed by the UNSC, as stipulated in the resolution. However, Albanians declared independence unilaterally in February 2008 and was recognized as such by the United States and its allies. The Albanians promptly abandoned the peace process.Instead of an internationally-endorsed negotiated outcome, the Albanians' initiative unilaterally imposed a political settlement on the mediating powers in complete disregard of UNSC authority that had placed under international administration. The subsequent involvement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) failed to resolve the remaining issues between Serbs and Kosovars.In addition to creating a troubling legal precedent, the example establishes a bad precedent for future conflict management initiatives, especially for ongoing conflicts in the Caucasus. Issues of concern include the viability of future interim agreements, good faith negotiations and the legitimacy and guarantees provided by the internationalization of conflicts, including the authority of international organizations, multilateral agencies and established legal standards. This paper draws parallels between the example and territorial disputes in the Caucasus as well as the implications of the model on conflict management processes.Keywords: Conflict management, Kosovo, South Caucasus.IntroductionThis article focuses on conflict management as it has evolved between the end of the Cold War and since the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the provisional authorities in on 17 February 2008. As such, we can now speak of a post-UDI conflict-management practice and there is a risk that the post-Cold War conflict management methods that offered so much hope in terms of cooperative international problemsolving are waning. Whether or not this spirit will return depends on the mutual trust between the major powers and of those powers in the international conflict management system, characterized by interlocking multilateral international organizations such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO.The argument proceeds from a short discussion of post-Cold War conflict management, its definition and practice as the antithesis of Cold War (or traditional) conflict management and how it seemingly applied to Kosovo. It then analyses the significance of the UDI as a break in the practice of conflict management. Three consequences follow from this break. First, incapacitating distrust of multilateralism owing to the unpredictability of outcomes. Second, suspicion of self-determination movements and small powers as being unable to follow the lead of great powers or the ordnances of international organizations. Third, return to an antecedent form of state-based conflict management, antithetical to the cooperative practice that evolved during the post-Cold War years that is now the new norm.Conflict management, in the case of Kosovo, cannot be taken apart; it has to be seen as a whole. The diplomatic maneuvers that generated the Rambouillet Accords in March 1999, NATO's Operation Allied Force from March until June 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999, the UDI on 17 February 2008 and the subsequent recognition of Kosovo's independence by certain Euro-Atlantic powers a few days later need to be understood in concert. The result is known as the Kosovo Model of conflict management. This article suggests that the consequences of this approach are nefarious for comparable international problems in other parts of the world, especially in the Caucasus. …