The Korean Peace Fund

Abstract

IntroductionIt has been said that everything is for sale. What about peace? Can peace and reunification between North and South Korea be purchased? Can war be avoided by simply paying for peace? This may not be as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, this was a U.S. government topic of discussion during the Clinton administration.1 If war is fought over money, and power and control over the people, land, and resources that produce it, why cannot we pay in advance to prevent it? I think we can, and I will present a model to accomplish this task, recommend who should be paid how much, and suggest where this money might come from.To convince the North Korean leadership to disband the army and to proceed with reunification, this model prioritizes three fundamental motivating incentives: (1) private wealth, (2) personal safety and freedom, and (3) honor and prestige. In addition to this top-down approach, bottom-up incentives are provided to the military and to the general population, recognizing the motivating role of women and children and the organic desire for family security. And perhaps most importantly, this model allows the North Korean leadership to save face and honorably opt out of their current predicament with dignity.2The Korean Peace Fund is explicitly designed to create the personal, economic, and political motivation for peaceful reunification. It is based on compelling personal and economic incentives, and on an empathetic appreciation of the North Korean political leadership and the average North Korean family. I propose nothing less than paying for the allegiance of 24 million people by offering sums equal to years of work to an average North Korean citizen and publicly honoring the North Korean leadership (for their heroic wisdom in stepping down) and buying them off with tangible in-the-pocket private wealth and international assurances of their personal safety and freedom to live and travel wherever they wish. The total price of peace is affordable, and a bargain of inestimable value when one considers that the possible alternative is war.This model provides enormous incentives to all North Koreans to join in the relative prosperity of the rest of the world. Popular support improves the likelihood of reaching a tipping point for Korean unification. Tipping points are of sensitivity when thresholds are reached and small things can have enormous consequences. Stoessinger calls them moments of truth when leaders cross thresholds into war (or peace).3 They can arise unexpectedly and alter the course of history.An Incentive Model for PeaceThe potential efficacy of this model is enhanced by cultural diffusion and the word-of-mouth rumor currently spreading across North Korean social networks that the outside world is a better place to live. A porous border with China and increased market activity has increased the spread of outside information and South Korean cultural products.4 Analyzing data from two large defector populations, Haggard and Noland assert, There is evidence of increasing willingness to defy the government through everyday forms of resistance, such as listening to foreign media.5 Information flows are subtly changing perspectives and aspirations throughout North Korea. As personal desperation and the aspirations of a new generation synergize with knowledge of the outside world, more people will realize they are trapped inside a self-limiting political-economic and cultural system and may seek alternatives. With greater access to outside information, the power elite is probably acutely aware of this relative deficiency.This model provides especially strong incentives for the power elite to reassess its options. In every polity, there are internal divisions at the highest levels of power and authority. Disagreements undoubtedly exist among elite power brokers in North Korea as crosscurrent objectives of cabinet, party, and military peer institutions clash. …