The implementation of decentralisation reforms in multi-level systems

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ABSTRACT In countries with multi-level governance, the balance of power between centre and periphery results from complex bargaining processes. Existing literature equates decentralisation to its de jure dimension, which risks missing variation in the extent to which decentralisation reforms take place. In this paper, we argue that decentralisation is a two-stage process. In the first step, political elites bargain and agree on reforms to the legal framework to reflect the distribution of powers between the centre and the periphery. In the second step, which we analyze empirically in this paper, decentralisation agreements must be implemented. If implementation is incomplete, decentralisation fails. Drawing on the Spanish case (1980–2022), our paper makes several contributions. First, we show that decentralisation implementation is more successful when regional governments are co-partisan with the national government. Second, results suggest that implementation is more successful if the national government has ideological preferences for decentralisation. Further, we show that a change in the national government composition between the agreement and implementation stages creates attrition to decentralisation. Finally, results suggest that the strength of ethnoterritorial parties in the national legislatures does not have an impact in the process while single-party absolute majorities at the national level forestall decentralisation implementation.