The game of safety behaviors among different departments of the nuclear power plants

Abstract

To study the developments and variations of unsafe behaviors in nuclear power plants thus reduce the possibility of human-related accidents, this paper, based on the Game Theory, focused on the changes in benefits of the Department of Management, Operational and Emergency in a nuclear power plant, and established the expected revenue functions of these departments. Additionally, the preventive measures of unsafe behaviors in nuclear power plants were also presented in terms of these 3 departments. Results showed that the violations of the Operation Department (OD) and the Emergency Department (ED) were not only relevant with the factors such as their own risks, costs, and the responsibility-sharing due to accidents, but also affected by the safety investments from the Management Department (MD). Furthermore, results also showed that the accident-induced responsibility-sharing of both the OD and the ED would rise, if the MD increased the investments in safety. As a result, the probability of violation behaviors of these 3 departments would be attenuated consciously, which would reduce the unsafe behaviors in the nuclear power plants significantly.