The fallacy of Chinese ‘strategy’ of five fingers of Tibet

Abstract

ABSTRACT Several Indian commentators claim that Mao Zedong enunciated a “Five Fingers of Tibet” Strategy to pursue a “revanchist” agenda of “reattaching” Nepal, Sikkim (a kingdom before merging with India in 1975) and Bhutan, and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA, presently Arunachal Pradesh) and Ladakh of India with Tibet (thus, with China) based on Tibet’s “historical claims” over them. They maintain that Xi Jinping is pursuing the same strategy toward the Himalayan region. They impute that this so-called strategy informed the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) attempts in May 2020 to change the status quo in border areas. Therefore, this article reviews the relevant literature published since the 1950s and seeks corroboration from contemporary experts on India-China relations, Tibet, PLA affairs and Chinese foreign policy to ascertain whether Mao propounded such a strategy and whether China ever pursued it. It concludes that there is little evidence to substantiate these contentions. Hence, the Five Fingers of Tibet is a faulty prism to analyze the India-China border dispute and understand China’s approach toward Nepal and Bhutan. Thus, this prism is liable to produce alarmist analyses, shaping public opinion, that may negatively impact India’s policy choices regarding China and its Himalayan neighbors, Nepal and Bhutan.