The Facts in Question: A Response to Dodd and to Candlish

Abstract

In the paper to which Julian Dodd and Stewart Candlish have both responded, I suggested that we think of 'the identity theory of truth' as encapsulated in a simple statement-that true thinkables are the same as facts. A conception of truth was then to be disclosed by elaborating upon what the simple statement reminds us of. I claimed that the 'identity theory' (i) lets us shun correspondence theories of truth (as we should); (ii) (correctly) treats truth as a sui generis norm; (iii) is not at odds with common-sense; and (iv) protects us against the deflationary attitude towards truth which one finds in some contemporary philosophers. By adverting to interpretive accounts, I hoped to find a perspective on 'is true' from which (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) could all be seen to come out good. (Interpretive accounts are, roughly, accounts of the speakers of a language L, in which a definition of truth for L plays the parts of L's theory of meaning.) Dodd now charges me with incoherence, and Candlish raises some questions. I start with Dodd's charge, and the question Candlish explicitly asks (?I). Then I attend to their other criticisms, hoping further to clarify what I wanted to achieve (?11).