Abstract
Jennifer Hornsby (1997) has recently made a case for a position which she calls 'the identity theory of truth'. I believe that she is right in thinking that a version of 'the identity theory is worth considering to the extent to which correspondence theories are worth avoiding' (1997, p. 6). But it seems to me that the kind of identity theory we should consider as an antidote to the correspondence theory has to be rather different to that envisaged by Hornsby.
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