Abstract
Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance.
Published Version
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