The Economic Consequences of Falling Dominoes

Abstract

THE SO-CALLED in its crudest form was often used in the past to justify U.S. economic and military assistance to the countries of Southeast Asia. While all factions of political opinion are probably dissatisfied with the outcome in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, we should try to resist the temptation to write off more than is necessary at this time. From a more general point of view, dominoes propped tip via patron-client relationships are perhaps more likely to fall down than those standing on their own; the Thai government's recent request for the withdrawal of U.S. forces has a pragmatic benefit-the elimination of tempting military targets for local insurgents. With even the Philippines reassessing the costs and benefits of the U.S. presence, some may argue that the domino theory has already been validated, but that sort of reasoning seems overly simplistic. Though the halcyon days of a neo-colonialist military presence are certainly over, a redefined multi-faceted relationship can still be worked out along the lines of mutual interest and benefit. Realistically, neither Burma nor Laos make much difference to U.S. foreign policy, except for the resources squandered in the latter country.' More generally, however, Southeast Asia occupies a strategic geographic position, its current economic importance may be much smaller than its potential, and large investments have already been made there. Because of these considerations, it seems likely that any vacuum that may develop would soon be filled-perhaps with surprising rapidity.2