The Domino Theory: Alternatives to a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Abstract

FOLLOWING THE EXPULSION of the United States from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos during the first months of 1975, the domino theory was resurrected by many Southeast Asian political leaders and commentators in their attempts to define the immediate significance of what appeared to be a dramatically new situation in the region and develop new foreign policies which might be more clearly appropriate. This did not mean that these reactions were in all cases supportive of those predictions most often associated with the theory. Indeed, political leaders in Singapore and Thailand repeatedly argued that their own countries were not dominoes. However, because of the unexpectedly military nature of the Communist victories in Indochina (as distinct from the expectation that the war would either continue or, more likely, end in a politically negotiated settlement), the domino theory served as an easy referent for a wide variety of opinions. These opinions were bounded, at the extremes, by those who believed that aggressive warfare would increase and those who thought that the end of the Indochina War would result in a new era of peace and neutrality for the region as a whole. The purpose of this essay is to examine briefly the political situation as viewed by political leaders within these countries during the spring and summer of 1975 and to discuss some of the international implications of these views. The organizing theme of the essay is summarized in the following proposition: