The Dynamics of National Executive Service: Ambition Theory and the Careers of Presidential Cabinet Members

Abstract

n 1966, Joseph A. Schlesinger claimed that the wellspring of politics is ambition and that the political behavior of politicians is shaped by the interplay between ambition and opportunity. Once an individual's ambition has been stirred by opportunities, subsequent behavior is designed to enhance the fulfillment of that ambition. While Schlesinger's work (and that of myriad other researchers in this area) is focused on public sector ambitions and elective office goals of politicians, it seems clear that the fundamental objectives of ambition status, power, wealthcan also be achieved both through appointive office and through a variety of private sector endeavors. Surely it is the case that the ambitions of individuals are stirred by the opportunity to serve in high-level appointive office, and that long-term career decisions of executive appointees are significantly affected by the availability of a variety of attractive private sector opportunities. This paper explores the utility of ambition theory in analyzing the recruitment and career patterns of cabinet appointees from the administrations of George Washington through Ronald Reagan. This is accomplished through an investigation of data on the pre-cabinet occupations of appointees and on their post-cabinet opportunities and careers. The historical breadth of these data allows for an examination of the