Abstract

This work takes a fresh conceptual and theoretical approach to the issue of job stability at the highest level of the federal bureaucracy—the presidential cabinet. Joseph A. Schlesinger's ambition theory provides the theoretical base for a systematic analysis of the turnover of cabinet appointees from the administrations of George Washington through Ronald Reagan. Findings support the contention that turnover (changing incumbents) provides a relevant and practical conceptual focus, potentially preferable to tenure (actual length of service). While findings are mixed, it is clear that public and private sector ambitions and opportunities do help guide the career decisions of cabinet appointees. For example, static ambitions toward government service provide incentives for cabinet members to leave their posts before the end of the term; progressive ambition toward the presidency or vice presidency is strongly related to an appointee's completion of the term. These, and other findings, have important implica...

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