Abstract

According to Jim Pryor�s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore�s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore�s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn�t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.

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