The Prima/Ultima Facie Justification Distinction in Epistemology

Abstract

The distinction between prima facie and what is sometimes called 'ultima facie' justification in epistemology is familiar. Yet I believe that its importance is generally under-appreciated. This distinction is extremely useful in making clear the demarcations between competing epistemological theories. I begin this paper by discussing the primary motivation for recognizing this distinction, and then enumerate the ways that it sheds light on the foundationalist/coherentist, internalist/externalist, and naturalism debates in contemporary epistemology. 2. Marking the Distinction The primary reason to make the distinction between prima and ultima facie justification is to make a place for epistemic defeasibility. The need for an account of defeasibility arises from the recognition that there are two rather different ways of having unjustified beliefs. One's belief might be unjustified because one bases one's belief on either bad reasons or no reasons. Let me briefly describe three cases that will serve as paradigms in the discussion that follows: