Abstract

Although the Organization of American States (OAS) failed to dislodge the de facto Roberto Micheletti government and restore President Manuel Zelaya to power after the coup d'état on June 28, 2009, international efforts to defend democracy in Honduras achieved some important precedents in terms of the use of the Inter‐American Democratic Charter (IADC). This article evaluates the application of the IADC during the Honduran crisis. It argues that the IADC's main challenge has to do with how it is used (or not) and by whom in the face of the contextual idiosyncrasies of each particular political crisis. The IADC proved its worth in the Honduran case, but the OAS hampered and distorted its use through a response that was too little, too late in terms of preventive diplomacy; went too far too soon in terms of punishing Honduras; that went too far too soon in terms of punishing Honduras; and, that suffered from the erosion of international unity following the country's suspension. The article concludes with three recommendations for strengthening the use of the IADC for preventive diplomacy: expand the good offices of the OAS Secretary General, make better use of OAS in‐country representatives, and democratize access to the IADC for domestic actors other than heads of state and government.

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