Learning the Hard Way

Abstract

The Honduran coup d'etat of 28 June 2009 triggered a series of measures by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the international community to restore ousted President Manuel Mel Zelaya to office and return the country to its previous democratic constitutional order. These international actions included forms of diplomatic isolation, such as the suspension of Honduras's membership in the OAS, as weU as economic sanctions imposed by the luces ofthe European Union, the Inter- American Development Bank, the World Bank, the Central American Integration System, and the Central American Bank of Economic Integration, in addition to individual countries such as the United States. Nonetheless, international efforts failed to dislodge the interim government headed by former President of Congress Roberto Micheletti and installed by the coup conspirators. Indeed, Micheletti and company were so successful at resisting international pressures that they were able to hand over power with impunity to President-elect Porfirio Lobo seven months later, on 27 January 2010. Michelletti enjoyed congressionally approved political amnesty to boot.Almost predictably, analysts criticized the OAS for yet another seemingly dismal defence of democracy in the Americas. According to some critics, Honduras represented a resounding failure of the inter-American democratic charter. To others, Honduras signified the triumph of realism over principles in international relations. Moreover, the incident seemed to prove once again that external actors had a negligible influence on domestic processes of political change. Honduras was also deja vu with regard to the OAS' s repeated failure at preventive diplomacy.1The Honduras debacle, however, was more nuanced than it seems at first glance. Certain elements of the international intervention were praiseworthy. For one thing, there was an international effort at preventive diplomacy, albeit a belated one. For the first time ever, a head of state - Zelaya - invoked article 17 of the inter- American democratic charter, the so-called self-help clause, to trigger an emergency meeting of the OAS permanent council just days before the 28 June coup. In contrast to past crises, such as in Bolivia (2003, 2005), Haiti (2001, 2004), Venezuela (2002), or Ecuador (2004-05), there was also little or no hesitation in the Honduran case to resort to the democratic charter. In fact, Venezuela and its allies put aside their prior resistance to endorse strongly the use of the democratic charter. The residual tensions in US-Latin American relations inherited from the Bush presidency (2001-09) did not impede a rapid response by the OAS once its member states decided to act. The diverse array of isolation measures and sanctions imposed by the OAS and the international community is likely the most formidable set of punitive measures adopted against any coup government in the two-decade-long history of the inter- American collective-defence-ofdemocracy regime. And lest we forget, the response to Honduras, at least initially, was also an unprecedented display of international consensus vis-avis the pariah Micheletti government.Accordingly, the OAS's efforts in Honduras were not a total disaster. Instead of dismissing international efforts to defend democracy outright, and in the interest of getting it right next time round, it is more fruitful to seek to understand the paradox of why the Micheletti de facto government did not buckle despite the rapid, determined, united, and powerful international response. Micheletti and his supporters held on for seven months even though international sanctions took a punishing toll on them. According to Honduras's new president, Porfirio Lobo, the sanctions took effect to the tune of US$2 billion dollars in a country notorious for its aid dependence.2In this article, I identify six lessons that, in combination, help explain the Honduran paradox, as well as where the OAS and the international community need to improve their efforts in order to defend democracy more successfuUy in the future. …