The Defence of East Timor: A Recipe For Disaster?

Abstract

The establishment of the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF) is proceeding expeditiously and creditably. By 2004-2005 East Timor will have a small but proficient light infantry force. But it will be expensive to maintain, and its strategic rationale is dubious. Such a force is not very well designed for addressing the conceivable (but improbable) military threats that East Timor might face. Maritime surveillance, patrol and enforcement capabilities are deficient. East Timor's security is much more likely to be endangered by its economic, social and political problems becoming unmanageable. Unfortunately, a major opportunity cost of the investment in the ETDF could well be a failure of the police, immigration, customs and judicial systems to cope with domestic and transnational crime; inadequate transportation and communications infrastructure, educational facilities, and commercial enterprises for sound economic development; and ultimately an incapacity for civil governance. The coordination of policies on the whole range of security challenges facing East Timor will be crucially important. Australia's contribution should be more balanced and less militarised.