Abstract

For a generation, the East Timorese independence struggle was ignored by Southeast Asian nations and by Australia. However, Indonesia's annexation never gained full international recognition, and with the failure to win the allegiance of the majority of the population and in the context of national political uncertainty; the crisis in the territory led to United Nations (U.N.) intervention. However, the U.N. mandate will be difficult to execute, given the material and political problems in the territory Indonesia's record has already generated unprecedented domestic and international scrutiny of the role of the military. The contribution of Australian diplomacy and military power to the resolution of the East Timor issue has brought into question longstanding Australian regional policies. In the case of ASEAN, which had previously supported Indonesia on the issue, the East Timorese independence movement has also raised difficulties for the grouping. Introduction Developments over the past year in East Timor have constituted a watershed for Southeast Asia, comparable in importance to the resolution in 1992 of the Cambodian conflict. Southeast Asia now has a new nation, one whose historical experience marks it out as diverging somewhat from the prevailing regional consensus. The size and scale of the United Nations-sponsored multinational INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) operation introduced into the territory- in September 1999 as well as the manner of its introduction also set new precedents. The UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) authority that succeeded it ensured that the United Nations will have a direct role in the region for some time to come. The consequences for individual nations have also been significant. On the one hand, the Australian Government has considerably reinterpreted a longstanding policy of regional engagement which may yet portend a different future response to the problems of Southeast Asia and beyond, and will certainly entail a new approach to such issues as military force configuration and expenditure as well as to diplomacy. On the other hand, the integrity of Indonesia has been challenged. These events have encouraged separatist trends in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere, and they have already led to re-evaluations at home and abroad of the Indonesian military and its political role and aspirations. This article reviews the background to the East Timor issue, considers the interventions of 1999 in the territory, and seeks to identify the sources of Indonesian and Australian policy, paying particular attention to the new challenges posed for policy-makers by the East Timorese independence struggle. It then concludes with a consideration of the impact of these events on ASEAN and on regional dynamics. The Failure of Indonesian Policy East Timor was formally incorporated into Indonesia as the nation's twenty-seventh province on 17 July 1976, after the invasion of the territory by elements of the Indonesian military on 7 December 1975, and intervention in the politics of the emerging nation from October 1974, On 27 September 1999, the Indonesian commander in Dili, Major General Kiki Syahnakri formally transferred authority for security in the territory to the INTERFET command, and the final elements of his force departed on 27 October. Between these dates Jakarta expended, given East Timor's insignificant size and population, prodigious amounts of blood and treasure in pursuit of a policy of integration. Yet this policy was evidently a failure. The reasons for this failure are a matter of considerable debate. They may be sought in the assumptions fundamental to Indonesia's conduct. They may also be attributed to particular dynamics within East Timor in the last decade, a time in which external pressures have played an important role. As to the former, it is clear that in the first few years Indonesian military policy was incoherent, producing widespread alienation of the population and many fatalities while being incapable of finally extinguishing the guerilla resistance of FALINTIL (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Timor-Leste Independente), the military arm of FRETILIN (Frente Revolutionaria de Timor-Leste Independente). …

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