The Contribution of the Tax and Transfers System to Poverty in Italy

This paper assesses Italy’s 2019 tax and benefit reforms, analyses hypothetical reforms and proposes a reform package that balances goals of reducing poverty, encouraging employment and fiscal sustainability. Using the OECD’s Tax-Benefit and the EUROMOD microsimulation models, it shows that the new guaranteed minimum income scheme introduced in 2019 significantly strengthens Italy’s low income protection system but can also financially discourage recipients from working. The debated flattening of personal income tax rates would do little to improve work incentives, but would drastically cut tax revenues and increase inequality, by reducing the progressivity of the personal tax system. A proposed reform package that maintains progressive personal income tax rates, gradually withdraws low-income support and provides additional benefits for low-wage earners would make inroads into poverty and inequality while encouraging formal work. This paper accompanies and extends the results of the in-depth chapter of the OECD 2019 Economic Survey of Italy (2019[1]) on social and regional disparities.

Who pays and how much? These are crucial questions for any tax system and, given the complexity of the economy, they are also among the most difficult to answer. This paper undertakes an analysis of the distribution of taxes and transfers in Canada using a static approach based on annual income combined with the novel approach of breaking down taxpayers by age cohort. The paper examines how tax rates net of transfers differ by age and income group, and how those rates change over taxpayers’ lifetimes. It clearly reveals the progressive nature of Canada’s tax system. In our base case scenario, when all age cohorts are considered together and transfers are treated as negative taxes, the first two quintiles of the income distribution are net recipients of government transfers with negative net tax rates equal to about -48 percent for the first quintile and -33 percent for the second quintile. For middle to high-income individuals net tax rates are positive and increase with income, from 10 percent for the median group, to 24 percent for the fourth quintile and 34 percent for the fifth quintile. Looking at net tax rates by age cohort, we find that overall the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution is a net recipient of fiscal transfers at all ages. However, on average for individuals 65 and over all but the top 20 percent of the income distribution are net recipients of fiscal transfers, with negative net tax rates. The age related redistributive nature of Canada’s tax system is further emphasized by an examination of the Gini coefficients for each age cohort, calculated here for the first time. Starting at age 30, before taxes and transfers income inequality is found to rise monotonically with age, leveling off at 65. Taxes and transfers reduce the degree of income inequality significantly for all ages, but substantially more so for the elderly due to age related features of the tax and transfer system. If redistribution can be thought of as a one of the fundamental features of the tax and transfer system in Canada, the extent to which it is targeted at the elderly is an important secondary feature.

Who pays and how much? These are crucial questions for any tax system and, given the complexity of the economy, they are also among the most difficult to answer. This paper undertakes an analysis of the distribution of taxes and transfers in Canada using a static approach based on annual income combined with the novel approach of breaking down taxpayers by age cohort. The paper examines how tax rates net of transfers differ by age and income group, and how those rates change over taxpayers’ lifetimes. It clearly reveals the progressive nature of Canada’s tax system. In our base case scenario, when all age cohorts are considered together and transfers are treated as negative taxes, the first two quintiles of the income distribution are net recipients of government transfers with negative net tax rates equal to about -48 percent for the first quintile and -33 percent for the second quintile. For middle to high-income individuals net tax rates are positive and increase with income, from 10 percent for the median group, to 24 percent for the fourth quintile and 34 percent for the fifth quintile. Looking at net tax rates by age cohort, we find that overall the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution is a net recipient of fiscal transfers at all ages. However, on average for individuals 65 and over all but the top 20 percent of the income distribution are net recipients of fiscal transfers, with negative net tax rates. The age related redistributive nature of Canada’s tax system is further emphasized by an examination of the Gini coefficients for each age cohort, calculated here for the first time. Starting at age 30, before taxes and transfers income inequality is found to rise monotonically with age, leveling off at 65. Taxes and transfers reduce the degree of income inequality significantly for all ages, but substantially more so for the elderly due to age related features of the tax and transfer system. If redistribution can be thought of as a one of the fundamental features of the tax and transfer system in Canada, the extent to which it is targeted at the elderly is an important secondary feature.

This paper estimates an Inequality Deflator for the Australian economy, which represents the distributional trade-offs that exist within the current tax and transfer system. These trade-offs can be used to evaluate policy alternatives where equity is an important consideration, as well as provide a normative evaluation of the trend towards increased inequality in Australia. This normative evaluation can be justified in two ways. First, in can be argued that the government has revealed a preference for distributional trade-offs through the tax system, which should be followed in other policy analysis. Second, this approach is equivalent to altering the standard Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion such that compensating payments are made through the existing tax system (rather than as lump sum payments). As such, implementing policy in this way, along with adjustments to the tax and transfer system, can be thought of as identifying realisable pareto improvements. In order to estimate an Inequality Deflator in the Australian setting, this paper develops an estimation method using The Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS). This methodology also allows for an Inequality Deflator to be estimated at the household level, and for different family types. Finally, the Inequality Deflator is applied to the Australian economy over the period 1994-2013 and finds that if the tax system was used to spread growth equally across the population, growth would be around 18 percent lower than recorded.

This study examined how Australia’s tax and transfer system, especially in relation to the Age Pension, impacts on household retirement choices. As the population ages, fiscal challenges created when many individuals retire from working and paying tax to drawing government funded benefits and services present some stark policy choices. Understanding how retirement decisions are shaped by the tax and transfer system is essential to developing a system that allocates resources efficiently across the economy, is consistent with principles of equity and is sustainable. Any such tax system is likely to have important implications for housing choices and housing markets.

Indonesian government has planned a policy in both accelerating the economic growth and reducing the income inequality. The improvement of income equality in Indonesia is conducted specifically through tax and transfer system. The progressive tax system is conducted to redistribute income and to reduce income inequality (measured by Gini index). The efficiency of a low tax system gave rise to suspicion that the system is not effective for reducing income inequality. This study examines the effect of fiscal policy on income ineaquality and economy growth in Java. To achieve the objective of study, the changes of macroeconomic indicators, tax system efficiency, and the changes of the income distribution is analysed using a panel data regression model. The results showed that the redistribution value of district/city is negative, indicating that the redistribution through taxes is not effective. In practice, the applicable tax system tends to widen the income inequality. The relation between equity income and economic growth show greater influence in the region with high income, whereas in regions with low income, incidence of such influence is very small indeed.

Two timely reviews of Australia’s transfer and tax systems were commissioned by the incoming government in 2008, although the GST, tax exemption of superannuation payments to people aged over 60, and pre-announced personal income tax cuts were placed outside the scope of inquiry. Most of the recommendations of the Harmer Pension Review have been implemented, but most of the recommendations of the Henry Tax Review have not. The Henry recommendations provided for enhanced equity and efficiency through a broader and simplified base, concentrating revenue raising on personal and business income, private consumption, and economic rents from natural resources and land. They provide an integrated blueprint for ongoing debate over tax reform.

This paper shows that the system of taxes and transfers in Russia has a limited redistributive capacity vertically (among different income groups)—particularly when pensions are assumed to be deferred income—though it does achieve significant horizontal redistribution (among sociodemographic groups). The main results of the analysis, concern the Russian fiscal system’s limited redistributive effect,low effectiveness in poverty reduction, and relatively poor net financial impact on all demographic groups except pensioners. Firstly, benchmarking shows that the Russian system of direct taxes and transfers does not compare well with countries that achieve larger redistribution, in particular European Union countries. Secondly,net direct taxes (incorporated into disposable income) are always equalizing, but net indirect taxes (incorporated into consumable income) are unequalizing in both the benchmark and the sensitivity analysis scenarios. Thirdly, under the benchmark scenario, the net effect of the fiscal system is actually poverty increasing. Finally, it appears that all households of working-age people with and without children are net payers under the Russian fiscal system, while only pensioners’ households benefit from the fiscal redistribution in Russia under both scenarios. The main conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that there are both equity and efficiency reasons to review the tax and social spending structure. Such an exercise may require, however, a good understanding of the political economy of a potential reform.

We examine the factors behind rising income inequality in Europe's most populous economy. From 1999/2000 to 2005/2006, Germany experienced an unprecedented rise in net equivalized income inequality and poverty. At the same time, unemployment rose to record levels, part‐time and marginal part‐time work grew, and there was evidence for a widening distribution of labor incomes. Other factors that possibly contributed to the rise in income inequality were changes in the tax and transfer system, changes in the household structure (in particular the rising share of single parent households), and changes in other socio‐economic characteristics (e.g., age or education). We address the question of which factors were the main drivers of the observed inequality increase. Our results suggest that the largest part of the increase was due to increasing inequality in labor incomes, but that changes in employment outcomes and changes in the tax system also contributed considerable shares. By contrast, changes in household structures and household characteristics, as well as changes in the transfer system only seem to have played a minor role.

Income inequality in Colombia has declined since the early 2000s but remains very high by international standards. While most of the inequality originates from the labour market, wealth – and thus capital income – is also highly concentrated and the tax and transfer system has little redistributive impact. The tax-to-GDP ratio remains low. Consumption taxes, which tend to be regressive, account for the bulk. The progressivity of income taxes had been undermined by generous tax reliefs, which benefit the well-off most and increase tax avoidance opportunities. The tax system should be reformed to enhance progressivity and raise more revenue which could be used to expand social policies. Cash transfers to households are small and dominated by non-redistributive schemes such as contributory pensions. Education coverage has increased steadily but quality and equity in access at the tertiary level remain important issues. Though significant progress has been made towards universal health coverage, the financing and organisation of the health care system could be improved to raise the quality of care and reduce adverse incentives to remain in the informal sector.

This paper compares a stylised version of a basic income flat tax system (BI/FT) with a means tested graduated tax system (MT/GT), with particular attention paid to potential labour supply effects of taxes. A highly simplified simulation model is developed in which individuals are homogeneous except for the wage they face, and there is a single means‐tested benefit. In this model, moving towards universal benefits can raise labour force participation and such effects can outweigh the labour supply reductions of working taxpayers. The number of losers is found to be quite small relative to the number of winners. If a fully universal system is not adopted, a move towards it, by reducing the taper on means tested benefits at the expense of a higher tax rate, can lead to significant winners without losers. These findings do not appear to be sensitive to assumptions about the individuals’ utility function defined over income and leisure.

This paper discusses the tax and transfer treatment of private superannuation retirement saving and the public means tested age pension in Australia. Superannuation savings benefit from concessional treatment in Australia’s tax system by comparison with other forms of saving, measured against an income or consumption tax benchmark. In the drawdown phase, the age pension means test offsets this generous treatment for those in the middle but not at the top end of the distribution. However, it does so in a way that generates disincentives for work in retirement and, perversely, for saving, before and during retirement. We canvass a range of principled approaches that would provide support for saving across the life course while being more neutral and fair in both savings and drawdown phases. We conclude that a more coherent retirement tax and transfer system can be achieved by reducing tax concessions and making the age pension means test less harsh. In the long term, the tax and transfer treatment of retirement savings should be aligned with the treatment of savings in general.

Richard Epstein has argued that governments should pay compensation for regulatory actions that impose costs on a subset of society. I develop a model in which there are two groups, one of whom benefits from a regulation, and one of whom bears the costs. A potentially biased government sets the level of the regulation and also redistributes income across the two social groups via the tax system. When taxes are nondistortionary, the government chooses the efficient level of the regulation to maximize wealth and then uses the tax system to distribute this wealth according to its preferences. If the government is forced to pay compensation for the costs of the regulation, it simply undoes this via the tax and transfer system. When taxes are distortionary, societal wealth is monotonically decreasing in the degree of compensation to be paid, so that the optimal level of compensation is zero.

THE PARALLEL MARCH OF THE GINIS How does taxation relate to inequality, and what can be done about it?

This paper uses the 2013 Integrated Household Survey, collected by the Central Statistical Agency of Georgia (GeoStat), and data concerning government revenues and expenditures collected by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) along with other administrative agencies, and applies the CEQ methodology to analyze the progressivity of Georgia’s tax and transfer systems. The effects of a variety of policies are individually described, including personal income tax (PIT), value added tax (VAT) and excise tax. In addition, this paper assesses direct and in-kind transfers made by the Georgian government. The distributional effect of indirect subsidies, which are confined to the capital city, Tbilisi, are also considered, as well as the Agricultural Card program. The results show a stark difference between direct and indirect taxation. Direct taxes are progressive, and income tax is largely borne by high-income deciles. Meanwhile, the burden of indirect taxation is more evenly distributed, with the poor losing a higher percentage of income. Thus, the tax system is regressive. Overall, fiscal policy is progressive and equalizing, even before in-kind transfers for early education, and the Medical Insurance for the Poor (MIP), and Universal Health Care (UHC) programs are taken into account. The Targeted Social Assistance Program (TSA) and old-age pensions play a significantly pro-poor role. Fiscal incidence reduces poverty (under $2.50 USD’s per day) over 9 percentage points, the largest drop in poverty amongst the countries where CEQ analysis was performed. This paper concludes that excise taxes should be reassigned or eliminated to reduce regressivity, while PIT and the property tax could be broadened, which would expand the tax base.