The “China Model”— Merits and Demerits, A Review of the Last 20 Years of the Chinese Economy

Abstract

The “China Model,” which combines Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dictatorship with the use of a market economy, has been a long-term growth driver of the Chinese economy, but its content has undergone a transformation in terms of both governance and economic policy. In the early 2000s, competition among local leaders who were given sizeable discretionary authority led to dramatic regional growth but also produced various side effects. In the 2010s, however, a transformation to investment competition through debt occurred in local governments, resulting later in a real estate bubble and local fiscal crisis. The adverse effects of the Xi Jinping regime’s concentration of power have created balance sheet deterioration caused by years of excessive debt and overinvestment. The Chinese economy is now being forced to liquidate its deteriorated balance sheets, which have been weakened by years of excessive debt and overinvestment. The ineffective investments and the interest payments resulting from “implicit guarantee” by the governments have become a heavy burden on the economy, further distorting the distribution of wealth and leading to a slump in consumption. To break the current deadlock, major reform is needed, including the write-off of non-performing assets, which would bring about deflationary pressure, and the reduction of the role of state-owned enterprises, a change so significant that it would reshape the “form of the nation.” However, this would inevitably clash with President Xi Jinping’s pledge for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” a promise made to secure his extended tenure. Given that an extraordinary concentration of power is centered on President Xi and the Chinese autocratic system lacks a mechanism for regime change, achieving such reforms will be very difficult.