The causal theory of reference and religious language

Abstract

Only very recently have philosophers of religion begun to apply and adapt contemporary theories of meaning and reference to god-talk. Of particular interest here is the Causal Theory of Reference initially developed by Saul Kripke. 1 This theory is also known as the Historical Explanation View. 2 This theory offers a sharp contrast with traditional "descriptivist" theories of reference and poses some interesting and thorny problems when it is applied to god-talk. I will briefly sketch the essential differences between the two kinds of theories and then show the consequences of opting for a causal theory within religious language. Finally, I will argue that recent attempts to incorporate the causal theory within religious language have ignored a very significant consequent of the causal theory which makes the causal theory unacceptable for the religious person. I will conclude that some minimalist descriptivist theory is preferable within a religious context. Descriptivist theories of reference maintain that referring expressions such as definite descriptions and proper names are able to refer to some unique individual only because of some "content" or description or characteristic which truly applies to the individual thing named or described which is the referent. Let us focus here only upon singular, definite reference involving the use of proper names or definite descriptions of the form, 'the so-and-so.' According to the descriptivist accounts of reference, singular definite reference is successful only because the name or description "contains" some description of a property which is actually possessed by the individual. For reference to be completely successul there must be some unique reference which fits only the individual which is the reference of the referring expression under consideration. In other words given the old Principle of the Identity of Indescemibles, any individual must possess some unique property in order for us to