Abstract

We consider a test of expressive voting developed by Brennan and Lomasky (1993). They point out that in presidential elections the probability of a tie, and casting a decisive vote, increases “multi-billionfold” as the election becomes increasingly close. They conjecture that if voters are instrumentally motivated there would be enormous increases in voter turnout for presidential elections as they became close. When they find no consistent relationship between closeness and turnout in presidential elections since 1940, they conclude their test justifies a “decisive rejection of the instrumental voter hypothesis.” As dramatic as such a “multi-billionfold” increase is, we argue it would not motivate voting if an instrumental payoff was the only motivation for doing so. The Brennan–Lomasky test does give the correct result, but not for the reason they emphasize. They do see reasons why voting turnout would be moderated other than the dramatic probability of a decisive vote in close elections. Furthermore, they close their test by indicating that one reason turnout might be higher in close elections is that they are more interesting, which is congenial to an expressive account. We agree. We also argue that the observed tendency for voters to confirm their biases rather than change their minds provides additional support for expressive voting.

Highlights

  • Models based on expressive voting have yielded interesting results, implying support for such things as charitable policies by uncharitable voters (Tullock 1971) and brutal policies by decent voters (Lee and Murphy 2017)

  • They do see reasons why voting turnout would be moderated other than the dramatic probability of a decisive vote in close elections

  • They close their test by indicating that one reason turnout might be higher in close elections is that they are more interesting, which is congenial to an expressive account

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Summary

Introduction

Models based on expressive voting have yielded interesting results, implying support for such things as charitable policies by uncharitable voters (Tullock 1971) and brutal policies by decent voters (Lee and Murphy 2017). This represents a range of voter support difficult to imagine if voters were motivated solely by instrumental considerations, but intuitively plausible if voters are motivated by expressive considerations. Brennan and Lomasky reject the instrumental voter hypothesis Our examination of their test leads us to conclude that it always yields the correct conclusion even though the central rationale for the test is flawed

An Impressive but Meaningless Difference
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